We study the impact of the announcement of enforcement of financial and securities regulation by the UK's Financial Services Authority and London Stock Exchange on the market price of penalized firms. Prior literature on reputational penalties has suffered from the existence of a number of confounding factors that render it hard to disentangle reputational from other losses. In the UK, the FSA and LSE only make the investigation (and its result) public if and when the firm is found to have breached the rules and incurs a fine and/or an order to pay compensation. This means that the announcement of a breach is an exceptionally clean signal to the market about the extent to which the firm in question abides by its legal obligations. We find that reputational sanctions are very real: their stock price impact is on average almost 9 times larger than the financial penalties imposed. Furthermore, reputational losses are confined to misconduct that directly affects second parties who trade with the firm (such as customers and investors).
Introduction
A primary function of regulation of financial markets is to uncover and discipline misconduct. In the absence of effective monitoring and enforcement of rules of conduct, financial markets are particularly prone to abuse. The imposition of penalties on firms is an important part of the armory available to regulators and, following the financial crisis, regulatory authorities have shown a greater willingness to employ them.
However, this paper reveals that they are only one, and a surprisingly small, component of the overall sanctions available to regulators. There is another that has received less attention to date but is revealed in this paper to be potentially far more potent than direct penalties.
A firm's reputation reflects the expectations that its partners have of the benefits of trading with it. In general this is difficult to measure but the release of new information provides an opportunity to do so. In this paper, we study the effect on firms' reputations of the announcement by a regulator of corporate misconduct and examine whether following a firm's ‗naming' as a wrongdoer by a regulator, it suffers ‗shaming' in terms of lost reputation.
The role of ‗reputational sanctions' in regulating corporate enterprise is controversial. According to the author of the article in The Times quoted above, the very existence of reputational penalties is highly questionable; certainly to the degree necessary to add meaningfully to deterrence. Understanding enforcement is crucial to making sense of the links between legal institutions and financial development, much emphasized in the ‗law and finance' literature (La Porta et al, 1997 Porta et al, , 1998 . Whilst there is agreement that accurate indexing of the efficacy of legal institutions requires account to be taken of enforcement, there is as yet no clear consensus as to the best way to measure its intensity or effect. Looking at regulators' legal powers (La Porta et al, 2006) or budgets (Jackson and Roe, 2009) fails to account for differing institutional efficiency amongst enforcers and looking at the size of financial penalties imposed (Coffee, 2007) omits any deterrent effects of reputational penalties.
Prior literature on reputational penalties has suffered from the existence of a number of confounding factors that render it hard to disentangle reputational from other losses. In this paper, we present findings from a uniquely clean dataset of enforcement actions drawn from the UK: those taken by the UK's Financial Services Authority (‗FSA') and the London Stock Exchange (‗LSE'). The FSA and LSE investigate firms respectively for possible violations of financial regulation and listing rules, but only make the investigation (and its result) public if and when the firm is found to have breached the rules and incurs a fine and/or an order to pay compensation. This means that the announcement of a breach is an exceptionally clean signal to the market about the extent to which the firm in question abides by its legal obligations.
We conduct an event study of the impact of the announcement of such enforcement notices of breach on the stock price of the disciplined firm. We find that reputational sanctions are very real: their stock price impact is on average nine times larger than the financial penalties imposed by the FSA. Still more strikingly, reputational losses are confined to misconduct that directly affects parties who trade with the firm (such as customers and investors). The announcement of a fine for wrongdoing that harms third parties has, if anything, a weakly positive effect on stock price. We evaluate the long-term impact of regulatory sanctions by comparing the attrition rate of unlisted companies sanctioned by the FSA with matched samples of firms that were not subject to sanctions. We find that the failure rate of firms sanctioned for second party wrongs is much higher than that in the matched samples. Our results have significant implications for understanding both the determinants of corporate reputations and regulatory policy.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews theory and prior literature on the role of law enforcement in stimulating corporate finance, and the role of reputational sanctions in particular. Section 3 outlines the institutional framework of enforcement in the UK, and formulates hypotheses. In Section 4, we describe our data and methodology. Section 5 presents the results and conclusions, and implications are discussed in Section 6.
Theory and Prior Literature

Corporate reputation
A firm's ‗reputation' reflects the expectations of partners of the benefits of trading with it in the future. With asymmetries of information in product and capital markets, firms commit resources to activities which, independently of the quality of their past performance, might raise these expectations. For product markets, this includes investment in advertising and brand development. Such investment, which is lost if performance subsequently turns out to be poor, is thought to act as a credible commitment by the firm not to renege opportunistically (Klein and Laffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983) . For capital markets, firms invest in the production of reports for investors, and pay out free cash flows as dividends in order to signal the quality of their future projects (Bhattacharya, 1979; Easterbrook, 1984) .
Certain types of revelation may be expected to impact negatively on trading parties' expectations of a firm's future performance. For example, if a firm is found to have produced goods which do not meet mandated standards of quality or to have been at fault in accidents in which it was involved then it may be deemed to have taken inadequate prior precautions (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Mitchell and Maloney, 1989) .
Or if information conveyed to trading partners through advertising or financial statements is found to be false then trading partners will be skeptical about relying on them in the future (Peltzmann, 1981; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Alexander, 1999; Karpoff, Lee and Martin, 2008) . Similarly, providers of finance offer less generous terms to firms that are revealed to have made accounting misstatements (Graham et al, 2008 ). An announcement by a regulator that a firm has engaged in misconduct may constitute precisely this type of revelation.
Adverse revisions of trading partners' expectations should negatively affect a firm's future terms of trade and consequently its market value. The firm may also need to commit additional resources to bonding or monitoring mechanisms, such as advertising and brand investment. Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs (2009) show that share price reactions to the announcement of corporate misconduct are associated with subsequent changes in the level or certainty of earnings. We define the present value of such losses as a reputational cost.
Conversely, since reputation is associated with the value of future trading opportunities, revelations of misconduct that do not have implications for parties who contract with the firm should not devalue its reputation. For example, the firm's degree of compliance with laws designed to internalize social costs-tort laws, environmental regulations, and the like-will not affect its consumers and investors, other than through the direct costs of compliance (and penalties for non-compliance). Consequently, an adjudication that a firm is in breach of such laws should result in a decline in market value equivalent to no more than the expected cost of legally imposed penalties, compensation awards and remedial measures. This prediction receives support from US studies considering breaches of environmental law (Jones and Rubin, 1999; Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005) , tort law (Karpoff and Lott, 1999) , and other regulatory crimes which do not affect parties in contractual arrangements with the defendant (Karpoff and Lott, 1993) .
Financial regulation and enforcement
The ‗law and finance' literature emphasizes the significance of legal institutions for the successful functioning of capital markets (La Porta et al., 1997; 1998) . Effective investor protection rules, it is argued, mitigate agency problems between outside investors and management or controlling shareholders, thereby stimulating investment . A recurring criticism of this literature, however, has been its reductionist conception of ‗legal institutions' Spamann, 2009 ). In particular, it is said to underplay the potential role of enforcement in measuring the efficacy of laws (Coffee, 2007; Jackson and Roe, 2009 ).
If legal rules are understood as shaping the incentives of market actors, their practical impact will be a function of both the substantive rule and the enforcement technology. It is probably much more difficult to create effective enforcement institutions than it is to transplant substantive rules. Consequently to focus simply on the ‗law on the books' is to omit potentially the most important variables relating to legal institutions.
Whilst the potential significance of enforcement is now widely understood, no consensus has yet emerged on how best to measure its efficacy. An early attempt looks simply at the extent of the statutory powers available to regulators as regards penalties, compensation orders and the like (La Porta et al., 2006) . The authors conclude that private enforcement (class action lawsuits) is more strongly associated with deep and liquid securities markets than is public enforcement. However, their measure of enforcement fails to take into account differences in the use of enforcement powers. Jackson and Roe (2009) proxy for enforcement intensity by focusing on the resources available to securities regulators: that is, their annual staffing and budget.
They report that this measure of public enforcement explains variations in stock market liquidity better than measures of private enforcement used in La Porta et al (2006) . However, this measure itself fails to take into account differences in deployment of resources allocated to enforcers. Coffee (2007) argues that the most meaningful measure of enforcement intensity is one that focuses on outputs rather than inputs: that is, how many dollars of fines are paid, or years of jail time served, by wrongdoers? These measures, divided by the population of those regulated, give a clearer indication of the incentive effects of legal rules on rational parties' behavior. Even measuring such penalties, however, will be misleading if announcements of enforcement activity carry with them additional reputational losses for malefactors.
In particular, if enforcement intensity is measured by financial penalties imposed, the US looks to be an outlier in world enforcement activity (Coffee, 2007; ). The gap in aggregate fines, even adjusted for differences in market capitalization, is so large (an order of four or five times anywhere else) as to pose the question whether misconduct outside the US in fact goes unpunished. However, it may be that regulators elsewhere-whose budgets are no less, in per capita terms, than the US-rely more heavily on reputational than financial penalties (Jackson, 2008; . The difference may be more one of enforcement style than intensity.
Deterrence, compensation, and reputation
For a legal penalty to deter a wrong from which the defendant can gain a benefit w, the inequality w < pD
(1) must be satisfied (Becker, 1968) , where D is size of financial penalty and p (0 < 
This implies that reputational sanctions may help regulators to increase the upper bound of sanction efficacy in the presence of limitations on the size of feasible p and D.
When a corporate penalty for wrongdoing is announced, any associated reputational damage, R, comes from a worsening of the terms of trade of the firm with its second parties. We would therefore expect that R to be related to the magnitude of s but not t, with customers and investors trading on less favourable terms than previously with a firm that has inflicted a sizeable loss s on them but not third parties, t. In contrast, regulators will be concerned with the total social losses, s + t. The presence of reputational sanctions may also have implications for the design of prudential regulation for financial firms. Whilst capital adequacy regulation is primarily aimed at the mitigation of systemic risk, it is also applied to non-systemically important financial institutions with the goal of ensuring that financial firms have sufficient assets to pay regulatory penalties, thereby avoiding the problem of ‗judgment-proofing' (Clark, 1976; Correia, Franks and Mayer, 2002) . Capital is conventionally measured in accounting terms and, indeed, if it is held in part to ensure sufficient resources are available to pay for regulatory penalties (D) then there will be a need for adequate assets on the books. However, to the extent that the ‗true' sanction, including a reputational component (D + R), differs from the financial payment (D), then capital requirements calibrated on D alone will not be effective.
A further difficulty with reputational sanctions is that, unlike a financial payment, but like incarceration (Becker 1968 5 Note that this assumes that it is solvency not liquidity that determines the amount of compensation that can be paid. That is, if necessary, firms can raise external finance to pay compensation.
3 Are R and D sufficiently large relative to the value of the firm as to threaten the solvency of the firm and its ability to pay compensation?
Reputational losses will enhance regulatory enforcement if they are large and predictable relative to D, but not so large as to threaten solvency. On the other hand, regulators may be reluctant to disclose failures if the reputational consequences are unpredictable and potentially so large as to threaten the solvency of firms. The remainder of the paper attempts to address these empirical questions and consider their implications for regulatory policy.
Measuring reputational losses from regulatory intervention
Previous studies have estimated reputational losses by measuring stock price reactions around announcements by regulators of misconduct at US public companies (e.g. Karpoff et al, 2008) . The approach they take is to subtract any financial payments the firm is required to make (fines, compensation orders, etc) from the total stock price effect, and to measure reputational loss as the residual component of the firm's stock price decline.
A problem with this methodology is that there are frequently multiple announcements associated with a particular enforcement action. The first announcement is often that the regulator has commenced an investigation (though even this may be preceded by speculation in the press of a potential investigation). The second announcement concerns the conclusion of the investigation and whether the defendant has been found guilty or innocent, along with the size of any fine. Finally, consequent on the regulatory ruling, there may be subsequent private litigation by investors. Indeed, firms more often make payments in response to follow-on class actions by investors than fines imposed by regulators; for example, Karpoff et al (2008) report 231 cases in their dataset of financial settlements as part of class actions but only 47 cases of regulatory fines.
The approach that previous researchers have taken to such multiple events is simply to sum the total abnormal returns across all the events. However, with multistage events it is difficult to be sure that the later stages really relate to the original announcement and not to further information that was released during subsequent stages, or conversely that relevant information was not released between the reported stages.
Summing share price reactions therefore risks both over-and under-inclusion of information.
The foregoing allows us to state a number of properties that an ideal empirical analysis of reputational loss should possess: (i) there should be a clearly defined revelation of information relating to a firm's conduct; (ii) all information relevant to the firm's conduct should be released simultaneously; (iii) the direct costs associated with the revelation of information (for example, in this case the size of both publicly imposed fines/ compensation and private litigation) should be measurable when it is disclosed and distinguishable from the additional reputational loss. Data limitations owing in particular to the structure of US enforcement institutions have meant that these three conditions have not all been satisfied in prior literature. We believe that the analysis reported in this paper satisfies these three conditions and therefore provides a more robust evaluation of reputational loss than has been available to date. 7 We now turn to a description of our analysis.
Institutional Structure and Hypotheses
The Financial Services Authority and its approach to enforcement
The Financial Services Authority (‗FSA') is the UK's integrated financial regulator, with responsibility for banking, insurance, and financial market supervision. It was established in 1997, and took over as regulator for the full range of activities from
December 2001 under the Financial Services and Markets Act (‗FSMA') 2000. 8 The FSA is responsible both for the supervision of regulated persons and for enforcement of 7 This is true not only of the reputational sanctions literature related to enforcement of regulation but also of the empirical literature in economics and finance which tries to evaluate loss of reputation. None of the three most quoted papers in the area of reputational losses, namely Peltzman (1981) on false advertising, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) on product recalls and Mitchell and Maloney (1989) on airline crashes satisfy all three conditions. The first two papers involve multiple events and all of them have to make assumptions about the direct costs (of destroying or repairing defective products, product liabilities lawsuits or market losses).
the rules in appropriate cases. The FSA's Handbook of rules contains a wide range of conduct of business and prudential requirements for financial firms, as well as the UK Listing Rules applicable to publicly-traded companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (‗LSE')'s Main List. These rules are drafted with the FSA's statutory objectives in mind: maintaining market confidence; consumer protection; promoting public awareness of the financial system; and the reduction of financial crime.
9
The FSA has very wide enforcement powers, including the ability to pursue civil, and in certain serious cases criminal, sanctions against wrongdoers. 10 Another significant tool is the power to sanction wrongdoers by withdrawing their licence to conduct investment business in the UK and/or prohibiting them from doing so. 11 The FSA also has power simply to issue a public censure, without any formal penalty. 12 However, the FSA's stated position is that it prefers where possible not to resort to any type enforcement, but rather to resolve issues through supervision. Consequently, if a firm has an open and cooperative relationship with the regulator, the latter will be willing not to take enforcement action where a breach is identified, provided that the breach is not serious and the firm commits to putting matters right forthwith (FSA, 2009: 12) .
The FSA's enforcement activity consequently results in far fewer cases of publicly sanctioning defendants than does the SEC, even controlling for differences in size of the economy (Coffee, 2007) . Figure 1 shows the number and amount of fines and the statements of public criticism issued by the FSA each year. At first blush, the FSA's relatively modest enforcement intensity raises the question of whether too little effort is applied to punishing (and thereby deterring) wrongdoers. However, without a clear sense of the role played by reputational sanctions in the UK, such a conclusion may be premature. The FSA explicitly describes its strategy as focusing its enforcement efforts on the most serious wrongs (FSA, 2009 impact of enforcement-a plausible assumption-this might suggest that average reputational costs imposed would be higher in the UK than in a more enforcementintensive regime such as the US.
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[ Figure 1 about here]
Where enforcement action is taken, this ordinarily begins with an investigation (Blair et al, 2009 Again in contrast to the US, the announcement of an FSA enforcement action is unlikely to trigger any private litigation. Securities litigation, for example, is practically non-existent in the UK ), owing to differences in substantive law and litigation funding rules (Davies, 2007) . The foregoing features mean that the FSA's announcement of a final notice is a unique event associated with each enforcement action, conveying information that in a typical SEC case would encompass three or four separate announcements-investigation, conclusion, penalty, and civil actions. 20 This is highly significant for our purposes, because it gives a much ‗cleaner' and more complete announcement to the market. This makes the event study less prone to confusion over multiple announcements. Moreover, the immediate inclusion of information about the size of financial payments and lack of class action claims mean that no assumptions need be made about the accuracy of the market's estimates of future financial penalties.
The London Stock Exchange and AIM Rules
Whilst the FSA is responsible for the setting and enforcement of the Listing Rules governing firms on the LSE's Main List, the LSE itself is responsible for setting and enforcing the Rules of its Alternative Investment Market (‗AIM') (LSE, 2010).
Similarly to the FSA, the LSE has power to levy fines, to de-list, or simply to issue statements of public censure against firms found to be in breach of the rules. 21 The process of enforcement is similar to the FSA: no public announcement is made about enforcement activity until an investigation is completed, and the LSE prefers not to issue a public censure, reserving this for particularly serious cases (LSE, 2009 ).
20 It is, however, possible that in the case of international firms also publicly-traded in the US, an announcement of enforcement by the UK FSA might trigger subsequent class actions in the US. We check for this possibility in our data. See infra 21 AIM Rules for Companies, February 2010, rule 42. In contrast to the FSA, whose powers are derived from statute, the LSE's powers in relation to AIM-listed firms derive from firms' listing agreements, under which firms undertake to submit to LSE enforcement and to pay any fines levied against them. Prior to April 2010, the LSE had used those powers in only seven cases.
Formulation of hypotheses
A popular perception-as illustrated by the quotation from The Times at the start of this paper-is that the FSA and LSE's enforcement activities do not impose any meaningful sanction on wrongdoer firms. On this basis, the level of financial penalties is so low as to have no meaningful deterrent effect (Coffee, 2007) . However, a market reaction should be expected from either non-trivial financial payments or reputational losses, or both. If we state an initial hypothesis in positive terms, then the view expressed in The Times corresponds to a rejection of the following:
H1: Non-triviality. Enforcement by the FSA or LSE is non-trivial, such that its announcement has a measurable and statistically significant negative effect on the stock price of the defendant firm.
The FSA and LSE's approach to enforcement is consistent with the existence of reputational sanctions associated with the announcement of a breach by regulated firms of the FSA's rulebook or the AIM Rules, respectively. We therefore hypothesize that there will be a ‗reputational sanction':
H2: Reputational sanction. The publication of final notices of enforcement activity will be associated with abnormal losses to the firm's shareholders which exceed the value of any financial payments the firm is required to make.
The theory of reputation predicts that any such losses should, if they are reputational, be greater where the harm of the proscribed activity is felt by trading partners (customers and investors) as opposed to third parties. We conjecture that the reputational loss will be related to the information content of the regulatory announcement. In particular we consider whether it is less: (a) for large firms on which more information is in the market in any event; and (b) post the financial crisis of 2007 after which the degree of regulatory activity increased and may therefore be less informative about any particular case.
Finally, as described in the theoretical session, we examine another possible explanation of a market sanction exceeding the value of any mandated payments, namely that it is simply due to a loss of profits on the prohibited activity (Karpoff and Lott, 1993) .
Data and Methodology
FSA and LSE enforcement data
We examine all the press statements related to enforcement actions by the FSA and the LSE on their websites over the period 2001 -January 2011. We find 341 cases. Since we are interested in the share price reaction following the press statements we construct a database of all the press statements announcing sanctions imposed on listed companies or subsidiaries of listed companies. We drop all the cases regarding individuals or non listed companies. After this first filter has been applied, we obtain a sample of 83 cases.
Since the innovation of this study relative to the previous literature is the fact that the announcement of a sanction by the FSA and the LSE is a unique event, we take pains to exclude all cases where this may not have been the case. First, we exclude cases in which information about the specific case or about the investigation leaked into the market before the regulator's press statement. To identify these, for each of the 83 cases,
we check FACTIVA to see whether in the two years before the event, there were any press reports about the specific cases. We complement the analysis on FACTIVA with a search on the Lexis-Nexis database looking at the news in the categories ‗Law and Legal System' and ‗Crime, Law Enforcement & Corrections' in the two years before the announcement and up to two years following the announcement to confirm that there is no additional public or private enforcement on the case. In most we find nothing, indicating that the regulator's press statement is unanticipated by the market. However, we find announcements in three types of case: (i) where there is media speculation about an investigation at a particular company; (ii) where there is -voluntary‖ disclosure by the company that it is under investigation; (iii) where the FSA decides to make an investigation public, because, for instance, they think that this will bring forward witnesses (FSA, 2009: 31) ; and (iv) where an enforcement action on the same case starts in another country. In total we find 28 such cases where the information was already out before the regulator's press statement. We drop these from the sample.
Secondly, we filter out 7 cases where the press statements by the FSA or the LSE simply state that, -customers will be compensated as appropriate‖ without specifying the actual amount of the compensation. Any share price decrease in such cases could be a consequence of uncertainty about the amount of the compensation that the company will offer. Such announcements are not the only, or unique, events relevant for the firms in question. We therefore also exclude these cases.
Moreover, we exclude 3 cases for which there has been a change of ownership in the investigation period and 5 further cases for which other potentially confounding news about the company was announced in the newspapers the day before, the day of, or the day after the press announcement about the misconduct.
Having conducted these filtering exercises, we obtain a highly clean dataset of 40 events, for which the regulatory announcement is unique and contains full details of any financial payments by way of fine or compensation that the firm will as a consequence be required to pay. Of these, 37 are enforcement actions by the FSA and 3
are by the LSE. For the FSA, enforcement activity covers the full range of financial services regulation and the UK Listing Rules. For the LSE, it only covers breaches of the AIM Rules. A brief description of each case is reported in the Appendix and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
Characterization of wrongs
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we subdivide the sample according to whether the sanctioned misconduct was committed against customers and/or investors (26) or against a third party (14). This classification is performed on a functional, rather than a legal, basis. In the first category, we include mis-selling of financial products and misleading advertisements, each of which harms customers, and tardy or inadequate announcements of information to the market where mandated, which we take to harm the firm's investors. We refer to this category as second party wrongs, because the harm in each case is done to persons who are in an existing contractual relation with the firm.
In the second category, we include failure to comply with ‗gatekeeper' obligations designed to minimize the risk of money laundering by a firm's clients, market misconduct (for instance, trading in stocks to move the market price) and failures to comply with obligations to report transactions in other firms' securities. Any harm caused by this sort of failing is incurred by persons other than the firm's customers or investors. We refer to this category as ‗third party' wrongs.
Event study methodology
We employ standard event study methodology pioneered by Fama et al (1969) to evaluate the stock price reaction to the public announcement of misconduct. We calculate the abnormal share price reaction around the event. We use the market model as a benchmark model of normal returns 23 . The abnormal return for firm i at time t is defined as (1) where R i,t and R m,t are the returns on firm i's common stock on day t and the index of market returns on day t, respectively. The coefficient α i and β i are estimated from an ordinary least squares regression of R i,t on R m,t using a 260-day period consisting of days -261 to -2 relative to the announcement day. The average abnormal return for each day t in the event window is computed as 
Where N is the number of firms over which abnormal returns are averaged on day t. The cumulative average abnormal return for the window t 1 , t 2 is defined as
Parametric t-statistics for the mean abnormal returns are calculated from the crosssection standard error of abnormal returns. To make sure that the presence of outliers do not bias our results we winsorize the abnormal returns before estimating the test statistic.
We set all outliers to a 90% percentile of the data, meaning that all data below the 5th percentile are set to the 5th percentile, and data above the 95th percentile set to the 95th percentile.
Results
Effect on market valuation
Panel A of Table 2 shows the average cumulative abnormal returns in the event windows (0), (0,1), (-1,1) and the associated t-statistics and non parametric z-statistics.
We find that press statements by the FSA and the LSE about corporate misconduct result 23 On this, we follow Bhagat and Romano (2002) : -Since several studies have found evidence inconsistent with the economic models, in particular CAPM, the use of such restrictions is not appropriate. Hence most researchers have begun to rely on the statistical models to estimate the expected returns.‖ In any event, in short-horizon event studies the test statistic specification is not highly sensitive to the benchmark model of normal returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007) .
in statistically significant losses in shareholder wealth 24 . We focus our attention on the event window (-1,1) in order to capture all the impact of the event on the share price and to account for potential leakage of information the day before the press statement by the regulators. The 3-day average cumulative abnormal return is -1.68% and statistically significant (the t-statistic is -1.97, the Wilcoxon signed-rank z-statistic is -2.94). 25 This is consistent with H1 (non-triviality). Consequently we reject the null hypothesis that FSA enforcement is trivial.
[ Table 2 about here]
The reported abnormal share price reaction of -1.68% is an average of the effect of all press statements in our sample. By decomposing the sample into cases we characterise as involving second-and third-party wrongs, we can observe the specific effects associated with press statements referring, respectively, to misconduct affecting investors and customers, and to misconduct affecting third parties (such as the state, or other companies' investors). Panel B of Table 2 and Figure 2 report the CARs in the event window (-1,1) for each of these two categories. Doing this allows us to see that shareholder wealth effects are highly dependent on this stratification. While secondparty wrongs (against customers and investors) are associated with a -2.62% share price reaction that is strongly statistically significant (the t-statistic is -2.21, the Wilcoxon signed-rank z-statistic is -3.54), third party wrongs are in fact characterized by a positive stock price reaction of 0.24%, although this is not statistically significant. 26 The difference in market reactions among the two groups is statistically significant using both parametric and non parametric tests 27 .
[ Figure 2 about here]
In Figure 3 we enlarge the event window to -10 days, + 10 days and plot the CARs for the two subgroups of press. From this picture we can confirm that there is no evidence of leakage of information before day -1 and that the negative share price reaction for the customers/investors subgroup is not reversed in the subsequent ten days.
[ Figure 3 about here]
At this point, we do not know whether these market valuation effects are due to reputational losses, or to (differences in) financial payments required of the defendant firms. The next section explores this question in order to test hypotheses H2 and H3.
Measuring reputational loss
To measure reputational losses, we follow the -residual approach‖ used by Jarrel and Peltzman (1985) , Karpoff and Lott (1993) and Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) . We calculate the change in the share price ΔV t =V t -V t-1 in the event window around the 26 In so far as share price reactions represent an updating of investors' priors about the likelihood of misconduct and the form that it takes, the positive but insignificant share price reaction to revelation of third party cases may reflect a positive reaction to the news that a second party violation was not uncovered rather than a positive perceived benefit of a third party violation. 27 As a test of the filtering exercise, in Table 3 we report the results of three larger samples (51, 63 and 80) obtained by progressively reintroducing the cases that we filtered out according to their degree of reliability. In Panel A, we reintroduce 11 cases of leakage of information (but not where there is also a confounding event or a parallel enforcement case in the US) summing the share price reactions during the announcement date and the first day in which the market became aware either of the misconduct or the investigation. In Panel B, we reintroduce further 12 cases where there was no leakage but there was some confounding information during the actual date (i.e. the compensation was not determined). In the last sample, in Panel C, we reintroduce also cases where there was both leakage (so we need to sum up two events) and some confounding information. The results in Table 3 confirm the general pattern.
announcement of misconduct by the regulator and then subtract the amount of financial payments (fines and/or compensation) imposed by the regulator.
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Reputational loss = ΔV t -Fine -Compensation (4) As noted in section 3.1, there are two significant methodological advantages to studying data on FSA and LSE enforcement, as compared to the prior literature. First, ΔV t is calculated around a unique and well-defined announcement event, as opposed to aggregating the effects of multiple announcements over a period of time. Second, we do not need to make any assumptions about the ability of the market to estimate the size of future financial payments because this information is known in our sample at the time of the initial announcement. Consequently we simply need to subtract the financial payment (fine plus compensation) stated in the press statement from the total market effect.
For each statement, we calculate the mandated financial payments (fines and compensation) as a percentage of the firm's value prior to the announcement event.
Panel A of Table 4 reports that the average fine for the entire sample is 0.15% of firm value. If we decompose the sample into the two types of wrong with which we are concerned, we observe that the proportionate fine tends to be higher for wrongs against third parties (0.19%) than for wrongs against the customers and/or investors subgroup (0.13%). The amount of compensation is zero for the former subgroup and 0.18% for the latter. The overall average compensation amounts to 0.12% of firm value. It is therefore clear that differences in financial payments do not explain the differences in market reaction between the two subgroups of wrongs.
[ Table 4 about here]
In Panel B of Table 4 , we subtract the total financial payment from the market reaction to measure the reputational loss as the residual. We observe that reputational losses are negative and statistically significant for the entire sample (-1.41%). This allows us to reject the null hypothesis in relation to H2, namely that there is no reputational sanction associated with regulators' announcements.
Decomposing the sample, we see that the differences in overall market reaction are driven by differences in reputational losses rather than financial payments. The reputational loss for the customers/investors subgroup (that is, second-party wrongs) is -2.31% of market value, and is strongly statistically significant. 29 For wrongs to third parties, the reputational effect is in fact positive (0.43%), although it is not statistically significant. Figure 4 shows these results graphically. They are consistent with hypothesis H3, namely that reputational losses are only incurred where harm is done to parties who trade with the firm.
[ Figure 4 about here]
Cross-sectional differences in reputational sanctions
In this section, we employ a cross-sectional multivariate regression analysis to examine the determinants of the reputational sanctions. The dependent variable is the reputational sanction as defined in equation (4). 30 Table 5 reports the results. In the first model, we simply use a dummy variable customers/investors as regressor, which takes the value of one when the wrongdoing is against customers/investors and zero otherwise. The positive and statistically significant coefficient is consistent with our earlier results.
[ Table 5 about here] 29 This result is robust to excluding the 3 LSE cases and excluding also the 5 cases as discussed in note 20. 30 We run OLS regressions with robust standard errors. We then multiply both sides of the equation by -1 to make the interpretation of regression results more intuitive: that is a higher reputational loss is associated with a higher coefficient.
In the second model we introduce additional independent variables to test further hypotheses about the cross sectional determinants of reputational sanctions. H4 posits that the size of the financial penalty may act as a signal to the market of the seriousness of the wrong. We perform the first tests of the degree of complementarity between penalties and reputational sanctions by including financial payment, which is the amount of the fine plus the compensation as a percentage of firm value, as an independent variable in the regression. We also include market size, defined as the log of market value of common equity before the press statement and a dummy post-crisis, which takes the value of 1 if the date of the press statement is after June 2007. Finally, we control for possible differences in the reaction of investors in financial and non-financial firms through a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for financial firms. 31 Having added these additional regressors, the coefficient of customers/investors is smaller but still highly statistically significant.
The variable financial payment is not statistically significant, implying that the size of the penalty does not serve as a signal of the seriousness of the reputational consequence of a wrong. One possible explanation is that the fines are set according to a ‗gatekeeper' view of corporate liability (Arlen and Kraakman, 1997) , under which leniency is accorded to firms that have adopted systems to monitor and sanction employees engaging in proscribed behavior.
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However, the inclusion of financial payment as a regressor raises an issue of possible endogeneity if the FSA and the LSE take into consideration the potential market impact of the penalties they levy. There is no reference in the regulatory handbooks of the FSA to concerns of reputational damage when determining the size of fines. According to the handbooks, the penalty is set in relation to: a) the financial benefit, b) the seriousness of the breach, c) deterrence effects, and d) other mitigating factors (for instance, the degree of cooperation of the firm in question) (FSA, 2009) . Nevertheless, to test for possible endogeneity, we undertake a two-stage regression, using a variable that distinguishes between abuses that were -clearly profit enhancing‖ 31 The small sample size means it is not possible to introduce industry fixed effects at a higher level of granularity.
32 See supra note 3.
in impacting the cash flow of companies -for instance, mis-selling of products or misleading advertisements -from those that were not -for example, failure to have effective systems and controls in place to protect consumers' confidential information, not carrying out customer orders on a timely basis, and failure to keep the market informed of price sensitive information. Given the objectives of the FSA, this variable should be correlated with the financial penalty but not with reputational losses that reflect future worsening of terms of trade and it should therefore satisfy the conditions of being an appropriate instrument 33 . We found evidence that the variable was correlated with the financial penalty in the first stage regression; however, the predicted value of the financial penalty was never significant in the second stage, suggesting that the absence of a correlation between the financial penalty and reputational losses is robust to corrections for possible endogeneity.
Reputational sanctions are negatively and statistically significantly associated with market size (H5): the bigger the company, the smaller is the reputational sanction as a proportion of size. This is consistent with the prediction that there is more information in the market about larger firms and consequently the informational value to the market of an announcement by the regulator is proportionately smaller. 34 Finally, we observe that the coefficient for post-crisis is positive and statistically significant, implying that in the post-financial crisis world, reputational sanctions are more significant: ceteris paribus, press statements after the beginning of the crisis are associated with higher reputational damage. This suggests that revelation of misconduct had a greater effect on anticipated future earnings after the crisis than before it.
35 33 Section 5.4 provides some evidence for this. 34 It is also possible that in larger firms the section of the business that generated the wrong may be more clearly separated from other parts of the business, leading to a lower proportionate impact on expected future performance.
35 Very similar results are obtained when Tobit regressions are run instead of OLS, where the dependent variable is set to zero when reputational sanctions are positive to avoid treating these cases as reputation enhancing events. The results, both in the OLS and in the Tobit regressions, are robust if we winsorize the variable financial penalty apart from the variable market size which becomes insignificant. If we bootstrap the standard errors, we obtain very similar results. If we drop the outlier instead of winsorizing, we obtain the same results except for the variable market size which is non significant in all the specifications. The post-crisis effect is closely associated with the three cases of the AIM listed firms.
Reputational loss or profits forgone?
We have interpreted the -residual‖ share price reaction-over and above mandated financial payments-as reputational loss, defined as the present value of the more expensive terms of trade in the future. However, as discussed in the theoretical session, it may be that some or all of these residual losses may be explicable as profits that will be forgone from loss of future earnings on the proscribed activity in question.
The striking differences in the market response to the two different categories of misconduct are strongly suggestive that these losses are the result of reputational losses not forgone profits. There is no reason for believing that forgone profits should vary so greatly depending on whether on the harm is done against second or third parties.
However, we perform an additional robustness check distinguishing between the 13 cases of -clearly profit enhancing‖ activities from the 13 that were not, as described above. If some or all of the market loss was due to profits foregone from ceasing to engage in the misconduct, we should observe higher market reactions (net of financial payment) in the first group. To test this, we run a similar regression to that in section 5.3
on the subsample of cases of misconduct against customers/investors (25 cases), introducing the dummy variable, clearly profit enhancing. We retain the control variables which had explanatory power in the prior specifications. The results reported in Table 6 show that this newly created dummy variable does not significantly enter the regression in the two different specifications.
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[ Table 6 about here]
The results do not therefore appear to be driven by profits forgone from prohibited activities and further support our interpretation of these market losses as reputational sanctions.
Long-Term Consequences of Sanctions against Customers or Investors.
We turn to evidence on the long-term impact of regulatory sanctions. Since long horizon event studies have well known limitations (Kothari and Warner, 2007) We compare the failure rate of the sanctioned companies with companies with similar characteristics which have not been sanctioned by the FSA. We construct two matching samples: the first are firms in the same primary SIC code that are closest in nature to the relevant sanctioned firm in terms of their total asset size, solvency ratios and profit margins in the year of the sanction.. The second sample is the two closest companies. Table 7 records that the failure rates in these two matching samples, 10.6 and 12.9, are much lower than in FSA sanctioned companies. As robustness checks, in Table   7 we calculate the failure rates for two sub-samples: in Panel B, we exclude 9 cases where the FSA, in the final notice, mentions concerns about the financial soundness of the company in setting the size of the penalty and in Panel C we only include companies sanctioned before the start of the subprime crisis. In both cases, we obtain similar results suggesting that a regulatory sanction has an enduring impact associated with an unusually high failure rate of unlisted firms.
Conclusions and Implications
In this paper we report the results of a study of the reputational losses sustained by financial firms subject to sanctions by a regulatory body in the UK. Our sample consists of the entire population of regulatory enforcement actions by the UK's FSA and LSE against publicly-traded companies over the period 2001-January 2011.
The approach taken in this paper has significant methodological advantages over previous studies, stemming from the fact that the FSA does not announce investigations of misconduct until (a) they have been concluded and found against the firm, and (b) settled on the size of the penalty. The announcement by the FSA is therefore unusually
informative not only about the existence of misconduct but also about the direct costs incurred by firms.
We observe that the penalized firms' stock prices experience statistically significant abnormal losses of approximately nine times the fines and compensation paid. We interpret the fall in equity market value in excess of mandated payments as the firms' reputational loss. This is consistent with theories which suggest that revelation of information of misconduct by a firm will cause its trading partners -its customers and investors -to downgrade their assessments of its quality and adversely affect its terms of trade. Consistent with this, the negative share price reactions in our sample are entirely associated with cases where the misconduct involves harm to trading partners, for example, mis-selling financial products and mis-statements in financial reports.
Where the wrongdoing affects third parties rather than trading partners (resulting, for example, from failure to comply with rules about money laundering or reporting of trades in other firm's stocks), there are no statistically significant abnormal returns beyond the amount of financial payments required. In cross-sectional regressions, we find that the reputational effect is unrelated to the size of financial penalties levied and has increased in intensity since the financial crisis of mid-2007. We record an enduring impact of regulatory sanctions in terms of the high attrition rate of sanctioned firms.
Our results have significant implications for debates about regulatory policy. In terms of the criteria described in section 2.3, reputational losses are important forms of regulatory enforcement. They dwarf regulatory penalties such that, intended or not, they are the primary consequence for a firm of a revelation of its misconduct. At approximately 2.3% of market value, they are, however, a very long way from threatening the solvency of firms and preventing full compensation being paid to customers and investors.
What is much more questionable is the calibration of the penalties imposed. In the absence of reputational losses, penalties should be much greater in third party than second party wrongs. There is no evidence that they are and in the case of the UK, penalties appear too modest to restrain third party wrongs. The absence of reputational damage in the event of revelation of third party wrongs suggests that market processes are wholly inadequate for restraining such activity.
Penalties are much larger in the US, raising the possibility that they may be excessive when combined with reputational losses in cases involving second party wrongs. Indeed, it may be that in neither regime is there appropriate variation in regulatory penalties depending on whether the harm is caused to second or third parties.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the UK that the size of penalties levied is viewed by the market as informative about the seriousness of wrongs to customers and investors.
The revelation of misconduct itself, not the scale of the penalty is the source of the reputational damage. We report the results of three larger samples (51, 63 and 80) obtained by progressively reintroducing cases according to their degree of reliability. In Panel A, we reintroduce 11 cases of leakage of information (but not where there is also a confounding event or a parallel enforcement case in the US) summing the share price reactions during the announcement date and the first day in which the market became aware either of the misconduct or the investigation. In Panel B, we reintroduce further 12 cases where there was no leakage but there was some confounding information during the actual date (i.e. the compensation was not determined). In the last sample, in Panel C, we reintroduce also cases where there was both leakage (so we need to sum up two events) and some confounding information. T-statistics are calculated from the crosssection standard error of abnormal returns. We report also the Wilcoxon signed-rank z-statistics. (-1,1 *,** and *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively This table reports , for each year, in column 1 the number of unlisted companies sanctioned by the FSA and in column 2 the number of sanctioned companies that are not active at the end of 2011. The last two columns report the numbers of non-active companies in two matching samples. For each sanctioned company Matching sample A uses the firm the most similar (we look at 30 companies in the same primary SIC code with the closest total asset size in the year of the sanction and within this group we extract the company with the closest solvency ratio and profit margin). Matching sample B uses the two closest companies. The Failure Rate is obtained dividing the number of non-active companies by the total number (in the last column the total number is twice the number of sanctioned companies). Panel A reports the failure rates for the all sample, Panel B excludes those sanctioned companies for which the FSA mentions the existence of financial problems at the time of the sanction and Panel C is restricted to the first 6 years. 
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Figure 4. The Reputational Loss
This figure shows the reputational calculated by subtracting the financial penalty from the market reaction for the total sample, and wrongdoings against second and third parties.
